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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a lawyer who discovers that a client has several smoking-gun documents
that will doom the client’s case if produced in discovery. Also assume the client tells
the lawyer to use all lawful methods to avoid producing the information. Some legal
ethicists argue that the lawyer should comply with the client’s instruction and pursue
every permissible tactic, that is, go right up to the line but not cross it.1 Critics of this

† Copyright © 2015 Andrew M. Perlman.
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. B.A., Yale College; J.D., Harvard
Law School; LL.M., Columbia Law School. I am grateful to several friends and colleagues
who gave me valuable feedback on early drafts of this Article, including Tigran Eldred,
Russell Gold, Bruce Green, Jan Jacobowitz, David McGowan, Mark Rogerson, Patrick Shin,
Joshua Silverstein, Keith Swisher, and Bradley Wendel. I also benefited a great deal from the
assistance of research librarian Ellen Delaney and law students Dahlia Ali, Nicole Annmarie
Faille, Cody Friesz, Jared Heit, Micah-Shalom Kesselman, Christopher Miller, and Matthew
J. Smith. Finally, I received very helpful feedback during faculty workshops at Albany Law
School, St. John’s Law School, and Suffolk University Law School.
1. See, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, PAUL R. TREMBLAY & IAN S. WEINSTEIN,
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (3d ed. 2011); MONROE H.
FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS (4th ed. 2010); W. BRADLEY
WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010); Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The
Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Stephen L.
Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities,
1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613.
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so-called dominant view suggest that the lawyer should take into account other
considerations, such as the interests of justice or morality.2
One important practical problem with these competing prescriptions is that they
do not help lawyers avoid unethical conduct. For example, even though the dominant
view requires lawyers to protect the potentially discoverable documents only to the
extent permissible under the law, lawyers who claim to be following the dominant
view often cross the line.3 Similarly, prosecutors who are committed to the pursuit
of justice regularly fail to comply with their constitutional obligations to disclose
material, exculpatory information to defense counsel.4 These failures raise an
important question: Why do lawyers who subjectively believe they are complying
with prevailing theories of legal ethics—whether the dominant view or its
alternatives—fail to apply the theories in the manner scholars intend?
This Article suggests that the answer lies in social psychology. A vast body of
research reveals that situational factors, like placing a lawyer in a partisan role, can
result in behavior that is inconsistent with conventional ethics theories.5 This Article
suggests that legal ethicists can develop more accurate and useful theories by
accounting for the ways in which partisanship distorts objectivity, just as behavioral
economists have drawn on social psychology to develop more accurate and useful
understandings of economics.6
Part I of this Article offers a brief overview of the well-established debate over
the lawyer’s professional role and contends that existing theories rest on an
unacknowledged assumption about human behavior. The assumption, referred to
here as the objective-partisan assumption, is that lawyers are capable of acting as
partisans—being affiliated with one side of a matter—while remaining sufficiently
objective about their own conduct to resolve ethical dilemmas in the manner
theorists prescribe.
Part II contends that the objective-partisan assumption is flawed in light of what
social science tells us about partisanship’s distorting influence. For example, one
recent study showed that accountants are more likely to find that a company’s
financial reports comply with generally accepted accounting principles when the
accountants are placed in the role of the company’s accountant than when they are
assigned the role of the accountant for an outside investor in the same company.7
In other words, the accountants had some difficulty retaining their objectivity when

2. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); WILLIAM H.
SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS (1998).
3. See John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV.
505, 524–34 (2000); Barbara J. Gorham, Note, Fisons: Will It Tame the Beast of Discovery
Abuse?, 69 WASH. L. REV. 765 (1994).
4. See Editorial, Rampant Prosecutorial Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2014, at SR
10; Brad Heath & Kevin McCoy, Prosecutors’ Conduct Can Tip the Scales, USA TODAY,
Sept. 23, 2010, at A1; see also Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making:
Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006).
5. See infra Part II.
6. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (offering an
overview and history of the field).
7. Don A. Moore, Lloyd Tanlu & Max H. Bazerman, Conflict of Interest and the
Intrusion of Bias, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 37 (2010).
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they were placed in a partisan position.8 Studies reveal that lawyers have trouble
remaining objective under similar circumstances. For instance, lawyers have a
tendency to offer different assessments of the objective value of a case depending
on whether they are asked to represent the plaintiff or the defendant.9 These studies,
and others like them,10 suggest that partisanship has a tendency to distort
professional judgments.
Part III contends that, in light of these findings, prevailing legal ethics theories
contain questionable prescriptions. Consider, for example, the dominant view of legal
ethics, which posits that lawyers should pursue a client’s demands to the full extent the
law allows.11 The research on partisanship strongly implies that lawyers who adopt this
view will have difficulty identifying the line between permissible and impermissible
advocacy and that compliance with the dominant view will result in misconduct more
often than dominant-view proponents acknowledge.12 The research also suggests that
theories critical of the dominant view suffer from similar problems.13
Part IV explores how behavioral insights could make existing theories more
realistic and helpful. For instance, theorists could acknowledge that lawyers have
difficulty making ethical judgments in ambiguous situations and that, in those
contexts, lawyers should employ debiasing strategies, such as seeking second
opinions from trusted colleagues who are not working on the same matter or reaching
out to the ethics committees of local bar associations.14 These debiasing strategies
are not a panacea (in part because ethical issues are difficult to spot and because
colleagues can have partisanship biases in favor of the client as well),15 but they can
increase the likelihood that lawyers will act as legal ethics theorists intend.
Other strategies include exposing law students to the increasingly vast literature on
how cognitive errors lead to poor decision making and drafting rules and policies that
reflect partisanship’s distorting influence. For example, given that prosecutors regularly
make mistakes when deciding whether to disclose information to a defendant,16 theorists

8. See id. at 46.
9. See Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff & Colin Camerer,
Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1337 (1995) (finding that
lawyers’ assessments of the value of a case vary depending on which side the lawyers are
assigned to represent).
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See, e.g., BINDER ET AL., supra note 1; FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 1; Fried, supra
note 1; Pepper, supra note 1.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra Part III.B.
14. The recommendation to seek second opinions is not new. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Foreword, The Legal Profession: The Impact of Law and Legal Theory, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
239, 247 (1998) (“A lawyer confronting something that seems to be an ethics problem should
consult a colleague about whether there is such a problem and, if so, how she should go about
resolving it.”). But it has not previously been discussed in the context of the prevailing ethics
theories. Moreover, prior discussions tend not to draw on social science research, which
suggests that second opinions offer only a partial solution to the problem. See infra notes
153–155 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 153–156 and accompanying text.
16. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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could prescribe the greater use of an “open-file policy,”17 which gives the accused
access to all information in the prosecutor’s file. This kind of policy would reduce
the distorting effect of partisanship and increase the odds that prosecutors will behave
as theorists prescribe.
In sum, this Article contends that behavioral research can inform the foundational
legal ethics debate in ways that have not been fully explored. To be clear, a number
of scholars have drawn on social psychology to develop many useful insights about
specific problems in the field of professional responsibility,18 as well as other fields

17. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Disclosure Obligations, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1321,
1330 (2011).
18. See, e.g., MILTON C. REGAN JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET
LAWYER 291–351 (2004); JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY
FOR LAWYERS: UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND
DECISION MAKING 385–416 (2012); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise
of Risk Management, 96 GEO. L.J. 1909, 1939 (2006) (arguing that risk-management systems
impede moral decisions by diminishing individual responsibility and inducing moral apathy);
Lawrence J. Fox, I’m Just an Associate . . . at a New York Firm, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 939
(2000) (contending that students should be exposed to common social psychology themes in
legal ethics courses); Neil Hamilton & Verna Monson, The Positive Empirical Relationship of
Professionalism to Effectiveness in the Practice of Law, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 137, 184–
85 (2011) (arguing that law firm professional-development programs should combat
organizational cultures’ encouragement of unethical behavior); Art Hinshaw & Jess K.
Alberts, Doing the Right Thing: An Empirical Study of Attorney Negotiation Ethics, 16 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 95, 100 (2011) (showing existence of “pervasive cultural and structural
problem” in how lawyers think about negotiations); Pam Jenoff, Going Native: Incentive,
Identity, and the Inherent Ethical Problem of In-House Counsel, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 725
(2012) (arguing that corporate “cultural immersion” makes it difficult for in-house attorneys
to remain independent); Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411
(2008) (using social psychology to suggest ways to gain insights into “long-held assumptions”
about gatekeeping); Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House Lawyers,
Enterprise Risk, and the Financial Crisis, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 495 (discussing how cognitive
biases may affect in-house lawyers); Richard Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law: The
Judiciary’s Role in Fostering Unethical Behavior, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 115, 121–35 (2004)
(positing that situational factors, not intrinsic characteristics, produce unethical behavior);
Alan M. Lerner, Using Our Brains: What Cognitive Science and Social Psychology Teach Us
About Teaching Law Students To Make Ethical, Professionally Responsible, Choices, 23
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 643 (2004) (contending that professional-responsibility courses are not
training future lawyers to make ethical choices); Leslie C. Levin, Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers
or Bad Decisionmaking: Lessons from Psychology and from Lawyers in the Dock, 22 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1549 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK: LEARNING
FROM ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE PROCEEDINGS (2008) and discussing how commitments to a
course of conduct and self-deception may cause lawyers to act unethically); Robert L. Nelson,
The Discovery Process As a Circle of Blame: Institutional, Professional, and Socio-Economic
Factors That Contribute to Unreasonable, Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior in Corporate
Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 773 (1998) (identifying factors contributing to unethical
behavior among civil litigators in large law firms); Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience
by Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons from Social Psychology, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 451 (2007)
(discussing effects of conformity and obedience to authority on subordinate lawyers’ ethics);
W. Bradley Wendel, Ethical Lawyering in a Morally Dangerous World, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 299 (2006) (highlighting and offering tips for combatting subtle situational forces
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of law.19 The basic theories of legal ethics, however, have remained largely
unchallenged and unaffected by developments in social science.20 Moreover, the
literature has not fully examined how partisanship—a central and ubiquitous feature
of lawyering—can affect lawyers’ ethical decision making. This Article seeks to fill
those gaps with the goal of producing more accurate and useful descriptions of, and
prescriptions for, lawyer conduct.
I. THE OBJECTIVE-PARTISAN ASSUMPTION IN LEGAL ETHICS THEORY
Existing theories of legal ethics contain an important and largely unexamined
assumption—that lawyers are simultaneously capable of partisanship on behalf of
clients while remaining sufficiently objective to ensure that their own conduct is
ethical. This assumption, which is referred to here as the objective-partisan
assumption, can be found in all of the leading theories of legal ethics.
At the outset, it is important to be clear what is meant by “partisanship” and how
it differs from the legal ethics concept often referred to as the “partisanship
principle.”21 Traditionally, the partisanship principle has been understood as one
aspect of the dominant view of legal ethics—that lawyers should, “within the
established constraints on professional behavior, maximize the likelihood that the
client’s objectives will be attained.”22 Put more simply, a lawyer should pursue a
client’s cause to the full extent the law allows.
The word “partisan,” however, has a different meaning in social psychology. In
that context, it is commonly used to describe people who fit the dictionary definition
of a “partisan,” that is, those who are adherents to, or aligned with, a specific “party,
faction, cause, or person.”23 So lawyers may be partisans in the social-psychology
sense (i.e., adhering to a specific party or cause) without complying with the
partisanship principle (i.e., pursuing that client’s cause as far as the law allows). The
distinction is significant because critics of the dominant view reject the partisanship
principle but acknowledge that lawyers are partisans in the sense of being aligned
with a particular side of a matter.24 Unless otherwise specified, this Article refers to
“partisanship” in the latter sense.

affecting lawyer behavior); see also infra note 75.
19. See generally IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW (Jon Hanson ed., 2012).
20. But see Alice Woolley & W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and Moral Character, 23
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1065 (2010) (describing varied assumptions about human behavior
implicit in different theories of legal ethics).
21. See, e.g., WENDEL, supra note 1, at 6 (listing the “[p]rinciple of [p]artisanship” as one
of the “two principles that guide the actions of lawyers”); Daniel Markovits, Further Thoughts
About Legal Ethics from the Lawyer's Point of View, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 85, 109 (2004)
(“[T]he partisanship principle . . . remains, as Geoffrey Hazard has said, ‘at the core of the
profession’s soul.’” (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE
L.J. 1239, 1245 (1991))); Andrew M. Perlman, A Career Choice Critique of Legal Ethics
Theory, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 829, 846–50 (2001) (providing an overview of the
“partisanship principle”).
22. See LUBAN, supra note 2, at 12.
23. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 904 (11th ed. 2012).
24. See LUBAN, supra note 2, at 12–13; SIMON, supra note 2, at 9–10.

1644

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 90:1639

A. The Dominant View’s Objective-Partisan Assumption
The dominant view contains several related ideas, but one important principle is
that lawyers should pursue all lawful and ethical conduct a client requests.25
Supporters of this approach argue that it is a critical feature of the adversarial
system,26 or that it is an extension of the agency and fiduciary responsibilities at the
core of the attorney-client relationship.27 They also argue that the dominant view
furthers human dignity,28 autonomy,29 due process rights,30 and clients’ trust and
confidence in their lawyers.31
The dominant view is conceptually appealing, but it necessarily relies on the
objective-partisan assumption. According to the dominant view, a lawyer should
pursue a client’s interests to the full extent the law allows without crossing the line
between permissible and impermissible conduct.32 This prescription necessarily
assumes that lawyers are capable of acting as partisans—representing one side of a
matter—and actually identifying the line between permissible and impermissible
behavior. Critically, if lawyers cannot consistently and accurately locate that line,
compliance with the dominant view would produce impermissible conduct more
often than the theory’s proponents acknowledge and produce the ironic effect of
undermining rather than promoting the client’s objectives.
Consider a couple of examples. First, recall the hypothetical at the beginning of
this Article: a client gives a lawyer several smoking-gun documents that may doom
the client’s case if produced in discovery, and the client instructs the lawyer to use
all permissible methods to avoid producing the documents. Under these
circumstances, the dominant view requires the lawyer to pursue every lawful tactic—
to go right up to the line, but not cross it.33 The problem is that, if the lawyer is
encouraged to approach a line that the lawyer cannot clearly identify, the lawyer is
at a heightened risk of engaging in impermissible behavior, such as withholding the
documents under a frivolous theory of privilege or unresponsiveness.34 Such

25. See WENDEL, supra note 1, at 6; Fried, supra note 1, at 1066; Pepper, supra note 1, at
614. As explained in more detail above, this principle is sometimes referred to as the
partisanship principle. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the partisanship
principle’s meaning in the context of lawyering). To avoid confusion, the Article will continue
to refer to the partisanship principle as the dominant view, and the word “partisan” will
continue to be used in the ordinary dictionary sense of the word, which is more common in
the social psychology literature.
26. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 12 (1980); Murray L. Schwartz,
The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669, 671 (1978).
27. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 1, at 260.
28. Id. at 56–57, 69–70.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 25–29.
31. Id. at 128–29.
32. See LUBAN, supra note 2, at 11–12.
33. See W. Bradley Wendel, Busting the Professional Trust: A Comment on William
Simon’s Ladd Lecture, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 663 (2003) (observing that adversarial
discovery practice is one feature of the dominant view).
34. See Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054,
1079–85 (Wash. 1993); Beckerman, supra note 3, at 524–34; Gorham, supra note 3.
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behavior not only threatens the lawyer’s interests, but the client’s as well. For this
reason, proponents of the dominant view necessarily have to assume that the lawyer
is an objective partisan—capable of advocating for the client regarding the
production issue and reliably determining the line between permissible and
impermissible advocacy.
Second, imagine a lawyer suspects that a client plans to perjure herself at trial.
Under the Model Rules, the lawyer is permitted (or required if it is a criminal case)
to offer the client’s testimony if the lawyer “reasonably believes” the testimony will
be false.35 In contrast, the lawyer is prohibited from offering the testimony if the
lawyer “knows” it will be false.36 According to the dominant view, if the client insists
on testifying, the lawyer should offer the testimony unless the lawyer comes to
“know” the testimony will be false.37 The problem is that, when acting as a partisan,
the lawyer is at an increased risk of concluding that she “reasonably believes” the
testimony is false when she really “knows” it to be false. Again, to avoid this practical
side effect of the dominant view, theorists necessarily (albeit implicitly) assume the
lawyer is an objective partisan.
The objective-partisan assumption also appears in variants of the dominant view.
In an important recent book, Professor Bradley Wendel argues that lawyers should
not necessarily pursue all of a client’s “interests” to the full extent that the law allows;
rather, he contends that lawyers should pursue only a client’s “legal entitlements”
and only to the extent that those entitlements are “well grounded.”38 Wendel’s
approach is conceptually distinct from the dominant view, but it too relies on the
objective-partisan assumption. Namely, Wendel implicitly assumes that a lawyer has
sufficient objectivity to determine whether a proposition is well grounded even when
acting as a partisan. This assumption may be sound when the answer is clear (i.e., a
particular legal proposition is obviously, or obviously not, well grounded). But when
a legal proposition is closer to the line, such as in the perjury example above, Wendel
does not discuss if a lawyer will be capable of acting as a partisan and making an
objective assessment of whether the client’s position is well grounded.
The point here is not that lawyers will be unable to identify the line separating
permissible and impermissible conduct in all, or even most, instances when they
follow the dominant view or its variants. Rather, the claim is that theorists have

35. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2013) (prohibiting lawyers from
offering “evidence that the lawyer knows to be false”).
36. Id.
37. It is worth noting that some dominant view theorists, such as Monroe Freedman,
believe the Model Rule should be changed to permit criminal defense lawyers to offer perjured
testimony. See Monroe H. Freedman, Getting Honest About Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 133, 136 (2008). This prescription for a change to the positive law is beyond the scope
of this Article. For a discussion of the distinction between using legal ethics theory to inform
the positive law and using it to guide lawyers’ behavior in light of the extant rules, see Andrew
M. Perlman, Untangling Ethics Theory from Attorney Conduct Rules: The Case of Inadvertent
Disclosures, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 767 (2005).
38. See WENDEL, supra note 1, at 8. For other recent variations of the dominant view, see
DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC
AGE (2008) and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Dana A. Remus, Advocacy Revalued, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 751 (2011).
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not acknowledged their reliance on the objective-partisan assumption or analyzed
its accuracy.
B. The Critiques of Zealous Advocacy
Critics of the dominant view also fail to acknowledge the objective-partisan
assumption,39 resulting in two independent problems. First, as a result of the oversight,
the critics have not identified a potential weakness in the dominant view—that
lawyers may be unable to locate the line between vigorous advocacy and impropriety
in the objective manner that dominant-view theorists assume to be possible.
Second, and less obviously, the critics do not recognize that they also rely on the
objective-partisan assumption, causing the prescriptive power of their alternate
theories to suffer accordingly. Consider, for example, Professor David Luban’s
critique of zealous advocacy.40 He contends that lawyers should seek morally worthy
ends using morally justifiable means.41 A lawyer should be able to engage in this
kind of moral calculus in extreme cases because the ends or means will be obviously
moral or immoral. The problem is that Luban also assumes that lawyers will be able
to engage in this analysis in more ambiguous situations. That is, he assumes that
lawyers are capable of acting as partisans (in the sense of being aligned with one side
of a matter) while making independent moral assessments about the client’s ends or
the selected means. In other words, he assumes lawyers are objective partisans.
Professor William Simon has offered another oft-cited critique of the dominant
view.42 Simon posits that “[l]awyers should take those actions that, considering the
relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice.”43
Lawyers, according to this view, should not pursue their own unique conception of
justice or morality but should be guided by a concept of justice that is consistent with
the legal culture’s understanding of the concept.44
The problem is that Simon assumes that lawyers are capable of making objective
assessments about whether their conduct is consistent with the legal culture’s
understanding of justice. For example, prosecutors generally pursue the interests of
justice. Yet, as explained earlier, they often fail to comply with their ethical and
constitutional obligations to disclose material, exculpatory information to the
accused.45 Simon fails to acknowledge that lawyers necessarily interpret what justice

39. See Nathan M. Crystal, Developing a Philosophy of Lawyering, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 75, 89–90 (2000); Hazard & Remus, supra note 38, at 752–53 (offering
an overview of critiques of the dominant view, none of which focus on the dominant view’s
failure to consider insights from social psychology); Pepper, supra note 1, at 614 n.7
(collecting criticisms of the dominant view).
40. See generally LUBAN, supra note 2.
41. See id. at xxii; see also THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS,
CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed. 2009); THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A
CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT (1981).
42. See SIMON, supra note 2, at 138–39; William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in
Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988).
43. SIMON, supra note 2, at 138.
44. See id.
45. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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requires through the lens of their institutional role and thus may have difficulty
applying his theory in the manner he prescribes.
In sum, theories of legal ethics emphasize a number of principles and values, but
the theories all implicitly rely on an important assumption: that lawyers are capable
of objectively determining the actions they are supposed to pursue while engaged in
a role that necessarily entails some degree of partisanship. Whether this assumption
relies on an accurate model of human behavior is rarely discussed.
II. LESSONS FROM SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ABOUT OBJECTIVITY
Social science research reveals that the objective-partisan assumption is
problematic. Numerous studies demonstrate that our perceptions are easily distorted
by the situations in which those perceptions occur and that partisanship can have a
particularly strong distorting effect.46 These studies offer powerful evidence that
lawyers will have more difficulty making objective assessments on issues—such as
whether a course of conduct is legal, moral, or consistent with conceptions of
justice—than most theorists acknowledge.47
A. An Introduction to Relevant Concepts from Social Psychology
In his recent book, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Nobel Prize winner Daniel
Kahneman explains that we process information in two basic, but distinct, ways.48
One involves “fast” thinking, which causes us to reach rapid conclusions without
conscious awareness.49 For example, if a person approaches us quickly with a
menacing stare, we automatically and unconsciously interpret the person as hostile.50
No conscious thought is required to perceive the approaching person’s emotional
state.51 In contrast, our brains process other kinds of information in a slower, more
deliberate fashion, such as when we try to solve a complex math problem.52 In these
situations, we consciously direct our attention to a question and search for a
solution.53 Although Kahneman notes that these two methods of processing
information are simplifications and often operate simultaneously,54 the concepts are
helpful in understanding why the objective-partisan assumption is flawed.

46. See infra Part II.B.
47. Legal ethics theorists tend to assume that lawyers are immune not only to the effects
of partisanship but also to other situational forces that tend to undermine objectivity, such as
the range of biases and heuristics described in Part II. This Article focuses primarily on
partisanship because it is such a central feature of the professional role and has been shown to
have important effects on perceptions. Legal ethics theories may be incomplete in other
respects as well.
48. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 20–24.
49. See id. at 20.
50. See id. at 19–20.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 20.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 28–30.
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Consider how “fast” thinking causes us to misperceive simple stimuli, such as the
size of an object or the sound of a voice. This illusion, created by psychologist Roger
Shepard, 55 offers a useful illustration:

Figure 1. The Shepard Tabletop Illusion.

The tops of these tables appear to be different shapes, but they are actually the
same length and width.56 (To prove it, trace the top of one table and place the tracing
on top of the other table.) Here, “fast” thinking causes us to misinterpret the image.
One explanation is that our brains perceive the table on the left as a three-dimensional
object extending into the distance, so we interpret that image as longer and narrower
than it really is.57
Even our hearing can be affected by fast thinking. Consider the McGurk effect,58
which is created through the use of a video in which someone is shown speaking the
syllable “ga” repeatedly, but the audio is dubbed so that listeners actually hear the
orator saying the syllable “ba.”59 Most people who watch the speaker’s lips believe
that the orator is saying “da,” even though the actual sound is “ba.”60 The accurate
sound is heard by looking away from the speaker’s lips. As with the tabletop illusion,

55. See ROGER N. SHEPARD, MIND SIGHTS: ORIGINAL VISUAL ILLUSIONS, AMBIGUITIES,
AND OTHER ANOMALIES, WITH A COMMENTARY ON THE P LAY OF MIND IN PERCEPTION AND ART

48 (1990).
56. See id. at 46, 48.
57. See Christopher W. Tyler, Paradoxical Perception of Surfaces in the Shepard Tabletop
Illusion, 2 I-PERCEPTION 137 (2011), available at http://i-perception.perceptionweb.com/fulltext
/i02/i0422.pdf.
58. See Harry McGurk & John MacDonald, Hearing Lips and Seeing Voices, 264 NATURE
746, 746–48 (1976). A sample video illustrating the effect can be found easily online. See The
McGurk Effect, YOUTUBE (July 3, 2006), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aFPtc8BVdJk.
59. Audrey R. Nath & Michael S. Beauchamp, A Neural Basis for Interindividual
Differences in the McGurk Effect, a Multisensory Speech Illusion, 59 NEUROIMAGE 781, 781
(2012) (providing an overview of research on the McGurk effect).
60. See id.
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our fast brains rely on past information about what we are perceiving (here, the
movement of lips) and interpret the stimulus accordingly. In essence, basic
perceptions of sight and sound can be distorted because our fast brains automatically
(and sometimes erroneously) fill in information for us.61
Unconscious and automatic cognitive processes, such as heuristics and biases,
similarly influence our perceptions of more complex situations.62 Heuristics, or
mental shortcuts, help us navigate the world without the need to assess every new
situation from scratch.63 For example, heuristics help us to prepare for the person
with the menacing stare without having to spend valuable time consciously
appraising the person’s emotional state. If the person is, in fact, a threat, this form of
fast thinking serves an important function.
Heuristics and biases, though helpful, also come with a cost: they make us prone
to mistakes of judgment and perception in a wide range of situations. For example,
we regularly and unconsciously conform our opinions to the expressed beliefs of
those around us, even when those beliefs are ethically questionable (also known as
“groupthink”).64 We are willing to obey an unethical instruction because of
unconscious cues, such as the clothes someone is wearing or whether the person
issuing the instruction is perceived as a legitimate authority figure.65 We have
implicit biases concerning a wide range of personal traits, such as race, gender,
religion, and physical appearance, even in the absence of any conscious bias or

61. See id. at 785 (discussing finding that McGurk perceivers demonstrated increased
neural responses in the left superior temporal sulcus) .
62. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 107–95. See generally LEE ROSS & RICHARD E.
NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1991).
63. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 28.
64. See generally Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A
Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS: GEN. & APPLIED,
no. 9, 1956, at 1. The effect can occur even among skilled professionals. See Dina Badie,
Groupthink, Iraq, and the War on Terror: Explaining US Policy Shift Toward Iraq, 6 FOREIGN
POL’Y ANALYSIS 277 (2010) (attributing the change in the Bush administration’s views on and
eventual invasion of Iraq to groupthink).
65. See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL
VIEW (Perennial Classics 2004) (1974). The premise that clothes, for example, can affect one’s
willingness to obey instructions has been repeatedly tested and confirmed. See, e.g., Leonard
Bickman, The Social Power of a Uniform, 4 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 47 (1974) (connecting
subject’s compliance with orders of uniform-wearing individuals to the belief that uniformed
individuals have legitimacy); Brad J. Bushman, The Effects of Apparel on Compliance: A Field
Experiment with a Female Authority Figure, 14 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 459,
459–62, 464–65 (1988) (finding that compliance rates are higher when an order is given by a
uniformed individual); Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 211, 236 (2001) (“Numerous scholars and even judges have made the very
basic observation that most people would not feel free to deny a request by a police officer.”
(citing Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters”—Some Preliminary Thoughts About
Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 249–50 (1991)
(“Common sense teaches that most of us do not have the chutzpuh or stupidity to tell a police
officer to ‘get lost’ after he has stopped us and asked for identification or questioned us about
possible criminal conduct.”))).
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prejudice.66 We have a tendency to interpret information in ways that confirm our
preexisting views;67 we tend to be unduly optimistic about our prospects for the
future;68 we miscalculate the frequency of events based on how available they are in
our memory (the representative heuristic);69 we tend to place a greater monetary
value on items we own than on items we want to acquire (the endowment effect);70
and we attribute unwarranted significance to numbers we hear that have no rational
relationship to decisions we need to make (the anchoring effect).71 These and
numerous other well-documented heuristics and biases regularly cause us to make
errors of judgment and perception and to act in ways that are inconsistent with the

66. See generally MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN
BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE (2013); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA
L. REV. 1124 (2012) (documenting a range of implicit biases affecting the justice system). An
increasingly robust literature demonstrates that these biases also affect professionals. See
Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its Prediction of Thrombolysis
Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1231, 1231 (2007)
(concluding that “physicians’ unconscious biases may contribute to racial/ethnic disparities in
use of medical procedures such as thrombolysis for myocardial infarction”); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious
Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009) (reviewing implicit
bias research relating to judges).
67. See Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2098 (1979) (concluding those who have strong
opinions on complex issues are “likely to examine relevant empirical evidence in a biased
manner”). Biases can also dictate behavior, which, in turn, may confirm the initial bias. See
Carole Hill, Amina Memon & Peter McGeorge, The Role of Confirmation Bias in Suspect
Interviews: A Systematic Evaluation, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 357, 357 (2008)
(concluding “expectations of guilt can indeed have an effect on questioning style and that this
in-turn [sic] can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy effect”).
68. See Tali Sharot, Alison M. Riccardi, Candace M. Raio & Elizabeth A. Phelps, Neural
Mechanisms Mediating Optimism Bias, 450 NATURE 102, 102 (2007) (discussing the
often-incorrect tendencies of individuals to make “overly confident, positive predictions about
the future,” and how the brain generates the optimism bias).
69. For example, people often believe that homicides occur more often than suicides
because the media portrays the former with greater frequency than the latter. See Valerie S.
Folkes, The Availability Heuristic and Perceived Risk, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 13, 13 (1988);
see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 151–52.
70. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 289–99. But see Gregory Klass & Kathryn Zeiler,
Against Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics and Legal Scholarship, 61 UCLA L.
REV. 2 (2013) (questioning the endowment effect).
71. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 119–128 (discussing the anchoring effect). The
anchoring effect causes our estimations of a number to be anchored by a random number we
previously heard. See id. For example, if you were asked whether George Washington was
more than ninety-three years old at the time of his death, you would typically estimate his age
at death to be higher than you would if the anchoring question used the age of forty-two
instead. See id. at 119–20 (using Gandhi’s age in a similar example). Lawyers are subject to
this effect as well, such as when they negotiate the settlement value of a case. See Dan Orr
& Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and Negotiation: New Insights from
Meta-Analysis, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 597, 597–98 (2006).
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oft-assumed model of human objectivity and rationality.72 Put simply, we have
“bounded rationality.”73
A number of scholars have explored the implications of these and related concepts
for lawyers.74 This literature is increasingly vast and varied, and some scholars (such
as Professor Donald Langevoort) have spent considerable time over many years
writing about the subject in the legal ethics context.75 The role of partisanship,
however, generally receives limited attention.76 This oversight is surprising because
partisanship is a hallmark of the lawyer’s professional role, has been shown to have
important effects on human perception and action, and (as explained earlier) is
assumed by legal ethics theorists to have no effect on lawyer objectivity.
B. The Partisanship Problem
This Section reviews existing research on partisanship. These studies reveal that
partisans have difficulty assessing information objectively and that the
objective-artisan assumption is problematic.
The first work in this area was conducted over sixty years ago. In a classic study
on partisanship, students at Dartmouth and Princeton were shown a film of a
combative football game between their respective schools in which both teams were
regularly penalized for various rule violations.77 The students were asked to count
the number of penalties by each team, classify the penalties as either “flagrant” or
“mild,” and identify the team that initiated the violation.78 Researchers found that the
assessments of the Princeton and Dartmouth students were materially different.79
This study and others like it suggest that group affiliations affect perceptions.80

72. See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 6.
73. See Herbert A. Simon, Bounded Rationality and Organizational Learning, 2 ORG.
SCI. 125 (1991).
74. See supra note 18.
75. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853
(1995); Langevoort, supra note 18; Donald C. Langevoort, What Was Kaye Scholer Thinking?,
23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 297 (1998); Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A
Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75
(1993) [hereinafter Where Were the Lawyers?].
76. But see Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN.
L. REV. 1 (2009) (arguing that particular conditions or situational influences may trigger
partisan biases that cloud a lawyer’s judgment); Paula Schaefer, Harming Business Clients
with Zealous Advocacy: Rethinking the Attorney Advisor's Touchstone, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
251, 257 (2011) (using social psychology to show that partisan bias may “shade and distort”
the legal advice given to a client, how zealous advocacy is actually harmful to clients, and how
revisions to professional conduct codes can prevent attorneys from turning to the zealous
advocacy philosophy (quoting Robertson, supra, at 40)).
77. See Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129 (1954).
78. Id. at 130.
79. Id. at 130–32.
80. See Leon Mann, On Being a Sore Loser: How Fans React to Their Team’s Failure,
26 AUSTL. J. PSYCHOL. 37 (1974).
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1. Political Partisanship
The effect is similar for political partisans.81 In one study, Democrats and
Republicans were asked to evaluate a particular welfare policy.82 The participants’
assessment of the policy turned less on the perceived generosity of the policy and
more on the party who proposed it.83 The study found that liberal participants tended
to favor the conservative policy when told that Democrats proposed it, and
conservative participants leaned towards the liberal policy when told that
Republicans proposed it.84 Interestingly, both liberal and conservative participants
claimed they were judging the policy based on its content, so neither side appeared
to acknowledge partisanship’s influence over their perceptions.85 Thus, as with the
football study, individual affiliations affected perceptions.
Another conceptually similar study asked Israelis to assess Palestinian and Israeli
peace proposals.86 When shown the Palestinian proposal, some subjects were
(incorrectly) told that the Israelis made the proposal.87 Conversely, when shown the
Israeli proposal, some subjects were (incorrectly) told that the Palestinians made the
proposal.88 A control group was told the true identity of the side making each
proposal.89 The study revealed that Israeli subjects had more positive feelings about
the Palestinian plan when told that Israelis had proposed it than they did about the
Israeli plan when told the Palestinians had proposed it.90 In other words, by changing
the authorship of the plans, Israelis in the study stated a preference for the Palestinian
plan over the Israeli plan, and vice versa.91

81. See, e.g., Larry M. Bartels, Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political
Perceptions, 24 POL. BEHAV. 117, 131 (2002); Geoffrey D. Munro, Terell P. Lasane & Scott
P. Leary, Political Partisan Prejudice: Selective Distortion and Weighting of Evaluative
Categories in College Admissions Applications, 40 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2434, 2445
(2010); Conor Friedersdorf, This Is Your Brain on Partisanship—Any Questions?, THE
ATLANTIC (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/08/this-is-yourbrain-on-partisanship-any-questions/260518/.
82. See Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party Over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group
Influence on Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808 (2003).
83. See id. at 811 (“For both liberal and conservative participants, the effect of reference
group information overrode that of policy content.”).
84. See id.
85. See id. at 808, 811–12, 821.
86. Ifat Maoz, Andrew Ward, Michael Katz & Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation of an
“Israeli” vs. “Palestinian” Peace Proposal, 46 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 515 (2002).
87. See id. at 521.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 531–32.
91. See id.; cf. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1092
(2000) (discussing overconfidence bias as it relates to targets of social policies). In another
study on the “confirmatory” or “self-serving” bias, psychologists found that when two
groups—one pro-capital punishment and one anti-capital punishment—were shown the same
factual information about capital punishment, each group claimed that the information
reinforced its prior beliefs. See id. at 1093 (citing Lord et al., supra note 67, at 2102).
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Another illustration of the effect can be found in U.S. surveys of attitudes about
government surveillance programs. A 2013 Pew Research Center and Washington
Post survey asked U.S. citizens about the National Security Agency’s surveillance
programs under President Barack Obama.92 An earlier poll had asked about similar
programs under President George W. Bush.93 The 2013 survey found that, “while
there are apparent differences between the NSA surveillance programs under the
Bush and Obama administrations, overall public reactions to both incidents are
similar.”94 The survey revealed statistically significant differences, however,
correlating with party affiliation:
Republicans and Democrats have had very different views of the two
operations. Today, only about half of Republicans (52%) say it is
acceptable for the NSA to obtain court orders to track phone call records
of millions of Americans to investigate terrorism. In January 2006, fully
75% of Republicans said it was acceptable for the NSA to investigate
suspected terrorists by listing [sic] in on phone calls and reading emails
without court approval.
Democrats now view the NSA’s phone surveillance as acceptable by
64% to 34%. In January 2006, by a similar margin (61% to 36%),
Democrats said it was unacceptable for the NSA to scrutinize phone calls
and emails of suspected terrorists.95
These findings offer yet another example of how partisan bias can affect perception.
Of course, these kinds of results do not suggest that everyone is subject to partisan
bias. After all, a majority of people in each political party retained their preexisting
views on government surveillance regardless of who was in office.96 The point here
is that political partisanship can affect some people’s perceptions in particular
situations.
2. Professional Partisanship
It is tempting to conclude that the football and political partisan studies are
inapplicable to professionals (like lawyers) because, unlike sports fans and casual
political partisans, professionals are more informed about the subject matter of their
decisions and are trained to maintain their objectivity. Indeed, some research
suggests, for example, that political partisans are less likely to rely on heuristics when
they are more politically informed.97 Moreover, even when partisan biases exist, they

92. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MAJORITY VIEWS NSA PHONE TRACKING AS
ACCEPTABLE ANTI-TERROR TACTIC (2013), available at http://www.people-press.org
/files/legacy-pdf/06-10-13%20PRC%20WP%20Surveillance%20Release.pdf.
93. See id. at 2.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 3.
96. See Eugene Volokh, “Virtually Unyielding Preference for Partisanship Over
Principle?”, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 14, 2013, 5:08 PM), http://www.volokh.com
/2013/06/14/virtually-unyielding-preference-for-partisanship-over-principle/.
97. See Cindy D. Kam, Who Toes the Party Line? Cues, Values, and Individual
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often affect only a fraction of individuals.98 These findings imply that knowledgeable
professionals may be immune (or more fully immune) to partisan influences as a
result of their knowledge and experiences.
Existing research, however, does not support this conclusion. Several studies
demonstrate that lawyers tend to offer different assessments of a case’s value
depending on which side the lawyers are asked to represent.99 In one study, law
students were asked to review a litigation case file and imagine they were
representing one of the two sides.100 Although the facts given to each of the students
were identical, the students interpreted the facts differently depending on which side
they represented.101 Similarly, in a more recent study involving moot court
participants, students overestimated the legal merits of the side they were randomly
assigned to represent, even at the conclusion of the competition.102
These findings do not necessarily mean that a significant fraction of lawyers
would be unable to make ethics-related decisions objectively. When extending the
above findings to ethical choices, it is important to understand the heuristics
responsible for the above results. One is the optimism bias, which is the tendency to
imagine that our futures are going to be more positive (e.g., our health, our future
wealth) than we should reasonably expect.103 This bias contributes to a lawyer’s
unduly optimistic vision of a case’s prospects and thus partially explains why a
lawyer would tend to overestimate the likelihood of succeeding in a particular matter.
A second important contributing factor, at least in studies where lawyers are asked
to assess a case’s monetary value, is the endowment effect, which causes us to
demand more money to part with an item we own than we would be willing to pay
someone else for the same item.104 This heuristic may help to explain why lawyers
demand more money to settle cases they “own” (i.e., the plaintiff’s side of a case)
than they might be willing to pay if they had to “buy” the same case (i.e., by
representing the defendant).
If these were the only two heuristics responsible for the perceptions lawyers had
in the above studies, one might conclude that ethical decision making would not
necessarily be affected. When making ethical decisions, lawyers are apt to be less
susceptible to the endowment effect because, typically, there are no explicit

Differences, 27 POL. BEHAV. 163 (2005).
98. See Volokh, supra note 96.
99. See, e.g., Babcock et al., supra note 9 (finding that lawyers’ assessment of the value
of a case varies dramatically depending on which side they represent); Zev J. Eigen & Yair
Listokin, Do Lawyers Really Believe Their Own Hype, and Should They? A Natural
Experiment, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 239, 239 (2012) (finding that “following participation in moot
court contests, students overwhelmingly perceive that the legal merits favor the side that they
were randomly assigned to represent”); Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Pär Anders Granhag,
Maria Hartwig & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict Case
Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 133 (2010) (finding that “lawyers were
overconfident in their [case outcome] predictions”).
100. George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff, Colin Camerer & Linda Babcock,
Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993).
101. See id. at 145–53.
102. See Eigen & Listokin, supra note 99.
103. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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monetary valuations to make. Similarly, although the optimism bias may make a
lawyer unduly optimistic about the outcome of a case, it does not necessarily make
a lawyer unable to see the line between ethical and unethical conduct.105
Additional studies, however, suggest that partisanship itself—the mere placement
of a professional on one side of a potentially disputed matter—can have a distorting
effect on professionals’ perceptions and judgments, even when the optimism bias
and the endowment effect are not implicated.106
Consider, for example, a recent study of auditors at major accounting firms who
were given hypothetical accounting scenarios and asked to assess the accounting in
each situation.107 Roughly half the accountants were asked to assume that they were
retained by the firm they were auditing, while the rest were told to assume they had
been hired by an outside investor who was considering making an investment in the
company.108 In each scenario, the auditors were, on average, more likely to find that
the company’s financial reports complied with generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) when they played the role of the company’s accountant than when
they were assigned to be the investor’s accountant.109 The authors of the study
reached the following conclusion:
Participants were placed in partisan roles that gave them a reason to
desire a certain outcome. When asked then to make neutral judgments,
they failed to extricate themselves from the influence of their partisan
roles. It was as if, once they had arrived at a partisan perspective, the
justifications for that perspective were readily accessible in their minds
and so held undue sway over subsequent judgments, even when they
were made in the presence of an explicit goal of impartiality.110
In sum, the accountants had the same objective task—to determine whether the
financial statements complied with GAAP—but reached different conclusions
depending on which client they had been randomly assigned to assist.111 The study
suggests that partisanship itself is a situational force capable of distorting a
professional’s perceptions, including judgments relating to legal compliance.

105. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 234–44 (reviewing studies showing that some
experienced professionals are able to make accurate intuitive predictive judgments in certain
situations). On the other hand, there is reason to question whether experienced lawyers are
capable of making the kinds of predictive judgments that are necessary for sound intuitive
decision making across a range of situations. See Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 99, at
133 (finding that “lawyers were overconfident in their [case outcome] predictions, and
calibration did not increase with years of legal experience”).
106. See infra notes 109 and 113 and accompanying text.
107. Moore, supra note 7.
108. Id. at 39.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 46 (citation omitted).
111. Id.; see also Kaye J. Newberry, Philip M.J. Reckers & Robert W. Wyndelts, An
Examination of Tax Practitioner Decisions: The Role of Preparer Sanctions and Framing Effects
Associated with Client Condition, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 439 (1993) (finding that accountants are
more likely to sign a tax return containing a large deduction related to an ambiguous tax issue for
an existing client than when the accountant is trying to obtain a new client).
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Several heuristics likely contribute to this effect. For example, as a result of the
self-serving or confirmation bias, our recollection of information is “biased in favor
of information that is consistent with the desired conclusions.”112 So when we are
placed in partisan roles, we tend to filter information in ways that support that
conclusion (i.e., the conclusion favoring our clients). This effect complicates our
ability to make objective decisions, such as determining whether our clients are
complying with existing legal requirements, as in the accountant study above.
This research implies not only that professionals, like everyone else, are
susceptible to partisanship’s distorting influence, but also that there is reason to
believe that lawyers may be particularly vulnerable to this distortion given their
institutional function.113 First, unlike the accountants in the above study, lawyers are
supposed to make the best case for the client’s position. That is, lawyers are supposed
to take a partisan position, whereas the accountants in the study were not. Second,
lawyers tend to perceive themselves as objective, which has the counterintuitive
effect of making them less so. Research reveals that “telling people to be unbiased
or highlighting their commitment to objectivity fails to reduce bias and may even
exacerbate it.”114 Because lawyers are trained to be objective, told that objectivity is
a professional value, and praised for their objectivity,115 this training may have the
counterintuitive effect of making lawyers less objective and less able to engage in an
accurate assessment of new information.116
This effect is even stronger when people’s sense of identity and self-worth is tied
to their partisan stances. For example, one study revealed that an environmentalist
whose self-worth is connected to the success of the environmental movement is less
likely to acknowledge the validity of evidence showing a global disaster is not
imminent.117 In contrast, an environmentalist is more likely to accept that evidence
after receiving a self-affirmation unconnected to her role in the environmental
movement.118

112. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of
Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 114 (1997).
113. See Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?, supra note 75, at 104 (making a similar
observation).
114. See Geoffrey L. Cohen, Identity, Belief, and Bias, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND
LAW 385, 392 (Jon Hanson ed., 2012) (citations omitted) (citing Charles G. Lord, Mark R.
Lepper & Elizabeth Preston, Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social
Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231 (1984); Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey
L. Cohen, “I Think It, Therefore It’s True”: Effects of Self-Perceived Objectivity on Hiring
Discrimination, 104 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 207 (2007)).
115. See Lawrence S. Krieger, Institutional Denial About the Dark Side of Law School,
and Fresh Empirical Guidance for Constructively Breaking the Silence, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC.
112, 125 (2002).
116. See Jonathon R. B. Halbesleben, M. Ronald Buckley & Nicole D. Sauer, The Role of
Pluralistic Ignorance in Perceptions of Unethical Behavior: An Investigation of Attorneys’
and Students’ Perceptions of Ethical Behavior, 14 ETHICS & BEHAV. 17, 25 (2004) (finding
that lawyers tend to believe they have higher ethical standards than their peers).
117. See Anthony Bastardi & Lee Ross, Maintaining Self-integrity: Effects of Threat to
Personal Identity on Evidence Evaluation and Concession Making (2004) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
118. See id.
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Various studies have found that lawyers’ identities and feelings of self-worth
are particularly likely to be contingent on professional success.119 One scholar has
found that “lawyers are tremendously prone to insecurity and an unhealthy need
for status—a likely manifestation of the related law school paradigms around
contingent self-esteem and comparative worth . . . .”120 These findings imply that
lawyers who have contingent self-esteem will have greater difficulty accurately
assessing new information. Because their senses of self-esteem and identity are so
intertwined with client-favorable outcomes, these lawyers may find it more
difficult to assess information that tends to undermine their clients’ positions.
Finally, we might expect lawyers to be more susceptible to bias than the subjects
of the manufactured situations in the studies cited earlier. In real life, lawyers have
even stronger incentives to please clients and help them achieve their goals because
of the financial and professional benefits from doing so. Thus, there is little reason
to believe that lawyers facing real world ethical issues are more capable of resisting
the distorting effects of partisanship.
In sum, existing research suggests that partisanship may jeopardize a lawyer’s
ability to perceive a client’s situation accurately, give sound advice, and provide
ethically permissible representation. These dangers do not necessarily require a
rejection of any particular theory of legal ethics. After all, whether a lawyer follows
the dominant view or one of the alternatives, a lawyer still functions as a partisan.
For example, even lawyers who are expressly committed to the pursuit of justice,
such as prosecutors, are susceptible to the distorting effects of partisanship, as the
scholarship relating to Brady disclosures indicates.121
The implications of this research should not be overstated. The studies do not
show that lawyers’ objectivity will be compromised in all situations or that
partisanship is the most common reason for unethical behavior.122 Indeed, there
is an ample and rich literature describing a wide range of reasons for lawyer
misconduct and professional misconduct more generally. 123 Conversely, most
lawyers are capable of acting objectively and ethically in the vast majority of
situations. The point is that existing theories overestimate professional
objectivity and could be improved by incorporating a more realistic
understanding of lawyer behavior.

119. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 115, at 119.
120. Id.
121. See supra note 4.
122. See Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?, supra note 75, at 110 (contending that, “we
have no way of knowing how frequently the behavioral explanation [for unethical behavior] is
the best one”). Indeed, there are many causes of unethical behavior. See Francesca Gino, Shahar
Ayal & Dan Ariely, Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior: The Effect of One Bad
Apple on the Barrel, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 393 (2009). See generally OWEN FLANAGAN, VARIETIES
OF MORAL PERSONALITY: ETHICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REALISM (1991).
123. See Linda K. Treviño, Gary R. Weaver & Scott J. Reynolds, Behavioral Ethics in
Organizations: A Review, 32 J. MGMT. 951 (2006) (offering an overview of social science
literature on ethics in various organizational settings).
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III. REVISITING THE OBJECTIVE-PARTISAN ASSUMPTION IN LEGAL ETHICS THEORY
Thus far, this Article suggests that the leading theories of legal ethics have
unexamined weaknesses that could be addressed by accounting for the ways in which
partisanship distorts lawyers’ objectivity. Incorporating these behavioral insights can
benefit legal ethics theories in much the same way as those insights have improved
neoclassical economics. Part III.A explores the analogy to behavioral economics and
identifies some possible objections to it. Part III.B then explains where behavioral
insights are most needed and concludes that they are particularly valuable when
lawyers encounter factual or legal ambiguities.
A. An Analogy to Behavioral Economics
Behavioral economists emphasize that they seek to supplement—not replace—
neoclassical economics.124 Neoclassical economists traditionally assume that people
are rational, self-interested actors.125 Behavioral economists have shown that human
conduct varies in predictable ways from this assumed model and that, by
understanding these variations, it is possible to develop more accurate and useful
economic theories and policies.126
In much the same way, a behavioral theory of legal ethics is neither a rejection nor
an endorsement of any particular theory of legal ethics. Rather, a behavioral theory of
legal ethics is premised on the idea that lawyer behavior is not as objective or rational
as theorists typically assume. By understanding why lawyers’ behavior varies in this
way (e.g., by understanding when and how partisanship distorts a lawyer’s
perceptions), legal ethics theories can offer more accurate and useful prescriptions.
This analogy to behavioral economics is not perfect. Neoclassical economics
offers a descriptive model of human behavior, and its descriptive power can be
enhanced through the incorporation of behavioral insights.127 In contrast, legal ethics
theories are essentially normative—they tell lawyers how they should behave rather
than describing how they do behave. Because these normative theories do not purport
to describe lawyer behavior, they do not benefit from social science research on
human behavior in the same way as neoclassical economics.
That said, behavioral research can inform and improve normative theories. Consider
normative theories of economics, such as libertarianism,128 socialism,129 or the range
of economic theories in between. Each of these theories contains normative rather than
merely descriptive theories of economics, yet they all benefit from behavioral insights.
For instance, socialism can be (and has been) critiqued on the grounds that it relies on

124. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS 43–48 (rev. & expanded ed. 2009).
125. See E. Roy Weintraub, Neoclassical Economics, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY,
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/NeoclassicalEconomics.html.
126. See ARIELY, supra note 124, at 43–48.
127. See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 6.
128. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL
STATEMENT (1980).
129. See, e.g., KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (1848).
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an unrealistic vision of how human beings behave.130 Similarly, it has been suggested
that libertarianism can benefit from behavioral research through the development of
policies that retain freedom of choice but “influence choices in a way that will make
choosers better off, as judged by themselves.”131 Although this notion of “soft
paternalism”132 is controversial, the point of these examples is that both descriptive and
normative theories can benefit from behavioral research.
Similarly, numerous legal theories have benefited from behavioral insights. For
example, conventional theories of tort law prescribe a set of background principles and
prescriptions for human behavior in particular contexts, and legal scholars have shown
that social science insights can improve these conventional concepts.133 Put another
way, scholars increasingly have found that social psychology helpfully informs
foundational theories in many areas of law.134 Legal ethics should not be an exception.
Another analogy from a completely different context can help to explain why ethics
theories could benefit from behavioral science. Consider an archer whose objective is
to hit a target. This goal is easily understandable (the archer should try to hit the center
of the target), but that goal cannot be regularly achieved without understanding how
extrinsic forces, such as wind or distance, might affect the trajectory of the archer’s
arrow. Any useful set of prescriptions for archers cannot simply say: “You should hit
the center of the target.” The archer needs to be told how to do so, including how to
adjust her aim to account for the range of forces that affect her accuracy.

Figure 2. Partisanship’s Distorting Influence.

130. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GOOD SOCIETY: THE HUMANE AGENDA 59–60
(1996).
131. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 5 (2008) (emphasis omitted).
132. Cass Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, U. CHI. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (Jan. 20, 2007,
10:40 AM), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/01/libertarian_pat.html.
133. See Jon Hanson & Michael McCann, Situationist Torts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1345
(2008).
134. See generally IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW, supra note 19.
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In much the same way, theorists cannot simply instruct lawyers to pursue justice,
a conception of morality, or a client’s legal entitlements and expect lawyers to hit
their targets. Lawyers also must be told how to hit those targets in light of what we
know about the ways in which forces, such as partisanship, distort the lawyer’s aim.
A behavioral theory of legal ethics offers this additional guidance and provides a
critical, but largely unexamined, method for improving existing theories.
B. Legal Ethics Theory and the Problem of Ambiguity
Before turning to the question of how theorists might adjust their prescriptions to
account for situational forces such as partisanship, it is useful to understand when
these situational forces are most likely to distort a lawyer’s perception (i.e., when a
lawyer’s “aim” is most likely to be affected).
Consider the following examples:
(1)

A lawyer is representing the seller of a business and must disclose various
financial figures to the prospective buyer. The lawyer for the seller begins
to question the authenticity of the client’s financial figures but is not
certain that the numbers are actually false.135

(2)

A lawyer must decide whether an important document is responsive to a
particular document request. The discoverability of the document is
debatable because the law does not clearly resolve how broadly to
interpret the document request.136

(3)

A prosecutor who is seeking to convict someone for committing a
heinous crime comes across arguably exculpatory evidence the defense
does not have.137

In each of these cases, the truth is difficult to discern, either because the facts are
unclear (such as in the case of the financial figures) or the law is unclear (such as
determining whether particular information is discoverable or exculpatory). These
situations require the kinds of judgments that, when viewed through the lens of
partisanship, increase the likelihood that a lawyer will overestimate the accuracy of
the client’s information or the strength of the client’s legal position. In these contexts,
social science suggests that lawyers will have more difficulty making the kinds of
objective decisions existing theories assume.138 For example, studies suggest that
lawyers are willing to engage in impermissible negotiation tactics because of

135. Cf. Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical
Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 916–24 (1996) (providing an overview of fraudulent
loans in the O.P.M. case); Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 18.
136. See Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass’n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054
(Wash. 1993).
137. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
138. See Francesca Gino & Max H. Bazerman, When Misconduct Goes Unnoticed: The
Acceptability of Gradual Erosion in Others’ Unethical Behavior, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 708, 710 (2009) (noting that unethicality is more difficult to identify in ambiguous
situations).
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ambiguities in the law,139 and ample evidence exists that lawyers regularly make
cognitive mistakes in the third situation above.140
In contrast, partisanship poses less of a problem when the law or the facts are
easily discernible. For example, imagine a lawyer receives a document that was sent
by mistake from opposing counsel and must decide whether to take advantage of that
mistake. Rule 4.4(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct gives the lawyer
discretion to look at the document, so there is no ambiguity in that regard.141
Moreover, there is no debate about the facts—the document was sent to the lawyer
by mistake. Because the facts and the law are clear, existing theories can be applied
as intended. For example, the dominant view would suggest that, assuming the client
wants the lawyer to look at the document, the lawyer should do so. Partisanship is
less likely to cause the lawyer to engage in impermissible conduct under these
circumstances.
Other situations may involve legal issues or factual questions that are neither
ambiguous (as in the three examples above) nor clearly resolved (as in the case of
the inadvertently sent document). Rather, the legal issues or factual questions may
strongly, but inconclusively, favor a particular view. In these situations, partisanship
may have a distorting effect, but not as strong as when the law or the facts are more
genuinely in doubt. In other words, many (if not most) factual and legal issues are
neither clear nor unclear; they lie somewhere in between. The point is that
partisanship is more likely to have a distorting effect as the ambiguity of a legal or
factual question increases. Or, to use the archer metaphor, partisanship is most likely
to affect the lawyer’s aim and ability to hit a target when the facts or law are unclear.
Existing theories fail to account for this effect. Consider, for example, the
dominant view. Lawyers who adopt it are supposed to pursue a client’s interests to
the full extent the law allows and must therefore determine what the law actually
permits. The research on partisanship suggests that a lawyer will have difficulty
making this determination objectively, especially when the determination turns on
ambiguous facts or unclear propositions of law, as in the examples above. The result
is that lawyers in these kinds of situations will be more likely to make mistakes when
determining what is lawful, thus increasing the risk of crossing the line between
permissible and impermissible behavior.
One might think that this problem is one to be solved by rule makers rather than
dominant-view theorists. After all, if we know that lawyers are going to misinterpret
the location of the line between permissible and impermissible advocacy, the rules
might be drafted more strictly to ensure that lawyers steer clear of the behavior that
is of greatest concern. The problem with this solution is that cognitive biases do not
affect all lawyers the same way. Moreover, some ethical issues may be ambiguous
in some situations (say, where the facts are unclear) but quite clear in others. As a
result, overly strict drafting would unnecessarily deter legitimate conduct. This
problem, therefore, is not one that can be neatly solved through creative rule drafting.

139. See Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 18 (suggesting that ambiguities in law encourage
lawyers to engage in impermissible negotiation tactics).
140. See Heath & McCoy, supra note 4 (showing that prosecutors make cognitive mistakes
when determining whether particular evidence is exculpatory).
141. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 437 (2005)
(discussing Rule 4.4(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
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Dominant-view critiques suffer from similar problems. For example, as explained
earlier, William Simon believes that “[t]he lawyer should take those actions that,
considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem most likely to
promote justice.”142 David Luban has criticized Simon for prescribing an
unrealistically complicated analysis of whether a client’s position is just.143 Simon
replies that such an analysis is not as complicated as Luban suggests.144 This
intramural debate over the complexity of the analysis overlooks an even more
fundamental problem: even if lawyers are able to undertake the kind of analysis that
Simon prescribes, lawyers are not necessarily able to do so reliably in the context of
a particular representation. The reality is that lawyers who encounter legal or factual
ambiguities of the sort described above are more likely to misjudge what constitutes
a just course of action than Simon’s theory assumes.
These errors of judgment can be as problematic as those made by lawyers operating
under the dominant view. For example, prosecutors seek to achieve justice, but their
partisan role can infect their decision making and cause them to withhold exculpatory
information that they are constitutionally and ethically obligated to disclose.
Luban’s approach suffers from the same kind of problem. He proposes that
lawyers should pursue morally worthy ends using morally justifiable means.145 The
problem is that, even if moral calculations are easier to make than Simon’s
sophisticated judgments about justice, there is no reason to believe that moral
judgments are any more immune from partisanship’s distorting influence than the
kinds of judgments Simon recommends. Lawyers who are asked to make moral
judgments in the context of legal or factual ambiguities will have more difficulty
doing so than Luban’s theory assumes and can make the same kinds of mistakes as
lawyers who are committed to the dominant view or Simon’s position.146
This discussion suggests that legal ethics theories should not prescribe a
one-size-fits-all approach to lawyer conduct (e.g., instructing lawyers to pursue a
client’s interests, well-grounded legal entitlements, the interests of justice, some
sense of morality, etc.) Rather, as explained below, prescriptions need to vary
depending on the ambiguity of the law and facts involved.
IV. TOWARDS A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LEGAL ETHICS
To this point, this Article has suggested that theorists’ reliance on the
objective-partisan assumption is problematic, particularly when lawyers face factual
or legal ambiguities. This Part identifies several ways in which existing theories
could be refined to reflect this reality, such as prescribing more context-dependent

142. Simon, supra note 42, at 1090.
143. David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV. 873, 893–901 (1999).
144. William H. Simon, The Legal and the Ethical in Legal Ethics: A Brief Rejoinder to
Comments on The Practice of Justice, 51 STAN L. REV. 991, 995 (1999).
145. See LUBAN, supra note 2, at XXii.
146. See Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of
Self-Deception in Unethical Behavior, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 223 (2004) (finding that people
have a tendency to act self-interestedly while simultaneously believing that their moral
principles are upheld).
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behavior, advocating for revisions to certain features of the law of lawyering, and
encouraging changes to legal education.
A. Context-Dependent Prescriptions and the Importance of Debiasing
Legal ethics theories tend to offer a single, unvarying prescription for lawyer
behavior. These prescriptions, however, fail to account for the ways in which a theory
may be misapplied in light of partisanship’s distorting influence.147
Theories of legal ethics can—and should—account for these distortions through
more context-dependent prescriptions.148 For instance, rather than prescribing the
same conduct in every situation (e.g., pursuing the client’s interests to the full extent
the law allows), theorists should acknowledge that lawyers need to adopt a different
mindset when they are faced with ambiguous legal and factual questions, such as
those described earlier.149 In these situations, theorists should prescribe debiasing
techniques that reduce cognitive biases and increase the likelihood that lawyers can
make more objective and effective decisions.150 Debiasing strategies could include,
for example, seeking second opinions from more objective observers,151 or explicitly
writing out the counterarguments to a position.
The prescription to seek second opinions is particularly attractive because existing
structures exist to facilitate it. Large firms have general counsel or ethics committees
that can address ethics-related questions. Similarly, most bar associations have free
ethics hotlines to answer questions from solo practitioners and lawyers at smaller
firms. By encouraging lawyers to get these kinds of second opinions in situations
where cognitive biases are most likely to occur, theorists can increase the likelihood
that their prescriptions will be applied in the manner intended.152
Debiasing strategies, though useful, are not panaceas. One important problem is
that lawyers sometimes have difficulty identifying situations that implicate ethical

147. Cf. Woolley & Wendel, supra note 20, at 1066–69 (observing that existing theories
tend to treat all lawyers the same way and arguing that the theories need to account for
differences in personality traits).
148. See Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy’s Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984
WIS. L. REV. 1529 (1984).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 135–37.
150. See Ian Weinstein, Don’t Believe Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in Legal
Decision Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783 (2003) (exploring the impact of cognitive bias on
both lawyers and clients and suggesting how to identify and mitigate these biases).
151. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Addressing Partisan Perceptions, in RETHINKING
NEGOTIATION TEACHING: INNOVATIONS FOR CONTEXT AND CULTURE 115, 116 (Christopher
Honeyman, James Coben & Giuseppe De Palo eds., 2009) (“When partisan perceptions are
impeding dispute resolution, third party intervention is often necessary. This is because it can
be difficult for the parties to see that their perceptions are skewed.”); Hazard, supra note 14,
at 247; see also Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Creating
Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 913 (1997) (finding
lawyers less biased about their cases when forced to articulate the other side’s position).
152. But see RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK: LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 389–403 (2008) (noting a case where a lawyer sought a second
opinion from someone who also had a vested interest in the outcome).
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concerns—a problem known as “ethical fading.”153 This “fading” occurs for a variety
of reasons, including groupthink, optimism bias, deference to authority figures, and
the gradual nature in which many ethical problems arise.154 It is also difficult to
educate people about cognitive distortions because of “blind spot bias,” a bias about
our own resistance to bias.155 For these and other reasons, debiasing techniques, such
as encouraging lawyers to seek second opinions in appropriate cases, will not always
be effective. Nevertheless, by identifying the problem of bias and suggesting useful
(albeit not foolproof) solutions, scholars can improve ethics theories through more
realistic prescriptions for lawyer behavior.
These context-specific prescriptions for debiasing may seem divorced from the
conceptual world of legal ethics theories, but those theories are only useful insofar
as they reflect the way lawyers actually behave in practice. By acknowledging that
lawyers are susceptible to cognitive biases in certain situations and offering contextdependent remedies, theorists can develop more complete, normatively attractive,
and empirically justifiable prescriptions for lawyers to follow.
B. Debiasing Through Substantive Law
Another promising strategy for minimizing the effects of cognitive bias is to
develop laws, rules, or legal frameworks to help prevent biased decision making.156
This strategy of “debiasing through substantive law” is premised on the idea that it
may offer a less intrusive way to address bounded rationality than flatly prohibiting
certain choices from being made.157 For example, Professors Christine Jolls and Cass
Sunstein argue for increasing the percentage of outside directors on corporate boards
because those directors are less susceptible to cognitive bias.158 This approach is less
intrusive than, say, restricting or regulating a board’s choices and can have a similarly
positive effect. This concept of debiasing through substantive law has several
possible implications for the law governing lawyers, including the increased use of
law firm discipline and proactive entity regulations.

153. Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 146; see also Langevoort, Where Were the
Lawyers? supra note 75, at 113–14 (noting that lawyers have blind spots, particularly in light
of the structures of modern law firms).
154. Langevoort, supra note 18, at 509–11.
155. See Emily Pronin, Daniel Y. Lin & Lee Ross, The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of
Bias in Self Versus Others, 28 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369 (2002); cf.
Babcock et al., supra note 151, at 916 (“Another commonly discussed bias is overconfidence,
which refers to the tendency . . . to display inflated confidence in their judgments . . . .”
(emphasis in original)).
156. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD.
199, 200–01 (2006) (explaining that “debiasing through law will often be a less intrusive, more
direct, and more democratic response to the problem of bounded rationality”).
157. Id. at 206.
158. Id. at 217 (“Of particular relevance for our purposes is the idea that such directors may
help to overcome various biased judgments on the part of inside directors. For instance, inside
directors may fall prey to optimism bias in predicting corporate outcomes.” (citations omitted)).
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1. Law Firm Discipline
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct currently focus primarily, if not
exclusively, on the behavior of individual lawyers rather than the firms where those
lawyers work.159 Professor Ted Schneyer and others have argued that this lawyer-based
system of regulation could be usefully supplemented by a set of disciplinary rules
designed to regulate firms themselves.160 A couple of U.S. jurisdictions (New York and
New Jersey) have adopted a variant of this idea by imposing supervisory responsibility
on firms themselves and not just specific lawyers.161
One powerful argument for firm-based discipline is that it is sometimes difficult
to blame misconduct on any particular lawyer or group of lawyers. For example, the
cause of misconduct may be inadequate processes and procedures within the firm.162
Law firm discipline, such as public reprimands or monetary sanctions, can provide a
mechanism for holding firms accountable in these situations, thus incentivizing firms
to create more effective structures for ensuring appropriate conduct.163
A behavioral approach to legal ethics suggests a reason to endorse firm-based
discipline that has not been previously explored: the structures and systems that
would insulate the firm against firm-based discipline also might help to protect
lawyers against cognitive distortions, such as those produced by partisanship.
A rigorous system of firm-based discipline might incentivize firms to create
procedures that minimize the likelihood of cognitive errors. For example, firms
might ask their own lawyers to conduct case or project audits of colleagues. These
audits might involve a periodic review of a team’s decisions by a non-team lawyer.
This lawyer-auditor could be instructed to discuss questionable legal and factual
issues that the team has encountered or inquire about possible ethical dilemmas the
team failed to raise on its own initiative or failed to see because of ethical fading.164

159. See Ted Schneyer, The Case for Proactive Management-Based Regulation to Improve
Professional Self-Regulation for U.S. Lawyers, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 233 (2013).
160. See generally Adam M. Dodek, Regulating Law Firms in Canada, 90 CANADIAN B.
REV. 383 (2011); Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1 (1991).
161. Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm Discipline,
16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 335, 340 n.34 (2003) (citing New Jersey and New York rules). “The
New Jersey rule . . . requires law firms to make ‘reasonable efforts to ensure that member lawyers
. . . undertake measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers conform to the Rules of
Professional Conduct.’” Id. (citing N.J. R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (1984)). “The New York
rule, adopted in 1996, requires law firms to ‘make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in
the firm conform to the disciplinary rules.’” Id. (citing N.Y. R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 5.1(a)
(originally enacted as N.Y. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-104 (1996))).
162. See Mass. Bd. of Bar Overseers, Admonition No. 08-11, MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov
/obcbbo/admon2008.htm (finding failures in a large law firm’s conflicts detection system and
noting that “firm discipline” was not an option in Massachusetts).
163. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 161, at 335–36 (citing Schneyer, supra 160, at
35) (“[S]ome types of collective sanctions, such as public censure or shaming, may be more
effective against law firms than business corporations, because law firms belong to a
‘reasonably well-defined ethical community.’”).
164. Of course, other reasons exist, such as an unwillingness to alienate team members or
a concern that the inquiry may bring an unwelcome answer. Again, an audit is not a panacea,
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Such audits might help to identify problematic decisions, offer useful feedback, and
(most critically) protect long-term members of a team from biased decisions by
introducing an outsider’s fresh perspective.
Of course, firms could try audits or other debiasing strategies today without a
regime of law firm discipline. The point here is that law firm discipline might
incentivize the creation of structures that help to reduce the distorting effects of
serving in a partisan role.
As with other strategies, this approach is not a perfect solution. After all, law firms
already have an incentive to prevent ethical violations because of potential
malpractice liability.165 Law firm discipline, however, will create incentives to guard
against ethical problems that might not otherwise give rise to liability. With a realistic
threat of firm-based discipline, law firms will have a reputational incentive to
develop new and innovative structures that can more effectively prevent biased
decision making among lawyers in the firm.166 In other words, the substantive law of
lawyering can be used to incentivize firms to develop improved debiasing strategies.
2. Proactive Regulation
Another possible prescription is proactive regulation. Currently, the U.S. system
of lawyer regulation is largely reactive in the sense that lawyers interact with it only
when they are the subject of a complaint. In contrast, a system of proactive regulation
includes ex ante regulations that help to prevent ethical violations and malpractice
claims from occurring in the first place.167 For example, one modest way in which
the United States is proactive is through mandatory continuing legal education
requirements, which are intended to ensure that lawyers maintain a minimum level
of competence.
More elaborate mechanisms are possible, such as conducting routine audits of
firms to determine whether they have appropriate procedures in place regarding the
timely “provision of services, avoidance of careless errors, adequate documentation
of fee terms and billing, timely recognition and resolution of conflicts of interest,
sound records management, adequate supervision of practitioners and staff, and
prevention of trust account violations.”168 This kind of system can be found in other
parts of the world, such as England and New South Wales, and evidence suggests
that these systems may reduce ethics complaints and malpractice claims.169

particularly given the cost and time involved, but it can help to address aspects of ethical
fading.
165. See Julie Rose O’Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to
Professor Schneyer’s Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 29 (2002).
166. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 161, at 335–36.
167. Schneyer, supra note 159.
168. Ted Schneyer, Thoughts on the Compatibility of Recent U.K. and Australian Reforms
with U.S. Traditions in Regulating Law Practice, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 13, 32.
169. See Christine Parker, Tahlia Gordon & Steve Mark, Regulating Law Firm Ethics
Management: An Empirical Assessment of an Innovation in Regulation of the Legal Profession
in New South Wales, 37 J. L. & SOC. 466 (2010) (Eng.); Steve Mark, Views from an Australian
Regulator, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 45 (2009); Schneyer, supra note 160, at 27–37; see also John
Briton & Scott McLean, Incorporated Legal Practices: Dragging the Regulation of the Legal
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Behavioral research may help to explain why proactive regulations are effective.
These regulations increase the likelihood that firms will have appropriate oversight
mechanisms, such as policies regarding the supervision of lawyers and staff, that
reduce biased decision making. Again, as with law firm discipline, proactive
regulation cannot prevent all ethical problems, but it can foster the creation of more
robust internal regulatory structures that may debias the relevant decision makers and
reduce the likelihood of inappropriate conduct.
C. The Role of Discretion in Professional Rulemaking
Flaws in the objective-partisan assumption also have implications for the structure
of the profession’s ethics rules as well as the content of related policies. Regarding
the structure of the rules, one important debate among legal ethicists is whether
lawyers should be subject to law-like rules, such as those found in the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, or be afforded more discretion in the exercise of their
professional duties.170 For example, Professor William Simon has contended that
lawyers should have more discretion to make ethical judgments than the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct currently allow.171
The problem with the discretionary approach is that it assumes lawyers employ
their discretion in a manner that is consistent with theorists’ prescriptions. As this
Article makes clear, such an assumption is flawed, particularly when lawyers
encounter ethics-related issues involving legal or factual ambiguities.172 If the rules
offer more discretion, the law of lawyering will be even more ambiguous, increasing
the likelihood that various cognitive distortions will impact lawyers’ behavior. In
sum, a behavioral theory of legal ethics has implications for theorists’ views on the
structure of lawyer regulation and suggests that the movement towards law-like rules
will enhance, rather than detract from, lawyers’ ability to act in ways that are
consistent with the principles that scholars propose.
For related reasons, a behavioral theory of legal ethics suggests that rules and
policies could be revised to eliminate discretion in contexts where there is a
particularly high likelihood of cognitive error. For example, prosecutors regularly err

Profession into the Modern Era, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 241 (2008) (Eng.) (discussing
Queensland’s similar program). More recently, the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20
considered proactive entity regulation. See Memorandum from Jamie S. Gorelick & Michael
Traynor, Co-Chairs, ABA Comm’n on Ethics, to ABA Entities, Courts, Bar Associations, Law
Schools, and Individuals (Dec. 28, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org
/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111228_summary_of_ethics_20_20_commis
sion_actions_december_2011_final.authcheckdam.pdf. The Commission considered the idea
sufficiently worthy of future study that the issue was referred to the ABA Standing Committee
on Professional Discipline. See id. at 9.
170. See Simon, supra note 42; see also Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion
Seriously: Ethical Deliberation as Ethical Obligation, 37 IND. L. REV. 21 (2003); Fred C.
Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303,
1353–70 (1995).
171. See Simon, supra note 42.
172. See Robert W. Gordon, The Radical Conservatism of The Practice of Justice, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 919, 928 (1999) (criticizing Simon’s approach on this ground).
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when making case-by-case determinations about what must be disclosed to the
accused under Brady v. Maryland.173 This type of cognitive error can be reduced with
an “open file” policy.174 Such a policy gives the accused access to all information in
the prosecutor’s file, not just the information an individual prosecutor deems
exculpatory. Some prosecutors’ offices have experimented with this approach, and it
has received significant attention among scholars and the popular press.175 Although
it is not a panacea,176 this approach reflects the kind of practical prescription that
ensures greater compliance with existing theories of legal ethics.
D. Teaching Cognitive Bias in Legal Education
A final way to ensure that ethics theories are applied in the manner scholars intend
is to educate law students and lawyers about cognitive bias. Although the previously
mentioned blind spot bias makes this effort difficult, there are several promising
approaches. One social psychologist has found that, by making people more aware
of their own lack of objectivity, they can assess new information more accurately.177
This awareness is particularly effective when people are told about specific
individuals who have made mistakes due to cognitive errors rather than merely being
exposed to statistics about cognitive bias.178 There is also evidence that people are
less susceptible to partisanship’s effects if their identities and senses of self-worth
are not contingent on the outcome of a partisan fight.179
These findings suggest that some reforms to legal education might minimize
partisanship’s effects on judgment. For example, law schools could expose students
to social science research on objectivity and impartiality to help counter the
mythology of the lawyer as an objective partisan. Students could also be exposed to
the stories of specific well-regarded lawyers who engaged in ethical misconduct.180
This type of instruction could occur in first year lawyering classes, professional
responsibility courses, clinics, and any other setting where lawyering skills and
values are taught. This type of education will not provide complete immunization
against partisanship’s infecting influence, but it can increase the likelihood that
lawyers will recognize the limits of their own objectivity, employ debiasing
strategies, and make better decisions.

173. 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see supra note 4.
174. Yaroshefsky, supra note 17, at 1330.
175. See id. (arguing that broader disclosure obligations help to offset cognitive biases
among prosecutors); Editorial, Justice and Open Files, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2012, at A18.
176. See, e.g., Joel Cohen & Danielle Alfonzo Walsman, The ‘Brady Dump’: Problems
with ‘Open File’ Discovery, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 4, 2009, available at http://www.stroock.com
/SiteFiles/Pub829.pdf.
177. See Uhlmann & Cohen, supra note 114, at 207.
178. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 174.
179. See Geoffrey L. Cohen, Joshua Aronson & Claude M. Steele, When Beliefs Yield to
Evidence: Reducing Biased Evaluation by Affirming the Self, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1151 (2000).
180. For example, many professors ask disbarred lawyers to speak about their experiences
with students. Another option is to assign books and articles that explain why successful
lawyers have been disbarred or disciplined.
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Another option would be for legal educators to help students develop a stronger
sense of self-worth that is independent of professional and financial success.181
Some ideas include reducing reliance on the strict Socratic method (i.e., reducing
methods that are likely to embarrass or intimidate students), actively encouraging
students to seek out rewarding work instead of the highest paid work, developing
less demeaning grading curves,182 and urging students to retain their moral
intuitions instead of only engaging in the relativism-promoting exercise of seeing
the other side of every legal argument.183
Yet another option is to teach professional responsibility through simulation
exercises rather than through the more traditional discussion of cases and
hypotheticals. By placing students in realistic situations where they have to resolve
an ethical issue presented to them, they are more likely to learn how to identify
similar types of problems in practice.
Again, educating people about cognitive distortions does not automatically produce
objective partisans. After all, even if we know that the image of the tables earlier in this
Article is fooling us, it is difficult to see the tables as the same size.184 For conceptually
similar reasons, we have trouble identifying when we are subject to ethical fading even
when we are familiar with the concept. Nevertheless, the studies described above
suggest it may be possible to increase the likelihood that lawyers will identify ethics
issues accurately when they arise, just as we can learn to recognize that a
two-dimensional object depicted as a three-dimensional object can cause us to
misperceive its size. At the very least, theorists should consider how pedagogy might
ensure greater fidelity to the models of lawyer behavior that they propose.
CONCLUSION
Behavioral insights have informed many areas of law, including the field of
professional responsibility.185 Those insights, however, have had only a modest
effect on the foundational theories of legal ethics, even though those theories are, at
their core, prescriptions about human behavior. The reality is that lawyers’ conduct
cannot be understood, theorized about, or used to produce the best possible
regulations without an appreciation for the limits on human rationality and
objectivity. A behavioral theory of legal ethics offers a way to incorporate those
realties into the foundational debates on a lawyer’s professional role so that scholars
can produce more useful, normatively appealing, and empirically justifiable models
for lawyer conduct, regulation, and education.

181. Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence S. Krieger, Does Legal Education Have
Undermining Effects on Law Students? Evaluating Changes in Motivation, Values, and
Well-Being, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 261, 275–76 (2004) (demonstrating the effects of legal
education on law students’ self-worth).
182. Joshua M. Silverstein, A Case for Grade Inflation in Legal Education, 47 U.S.F. L.
REV. 487 (2013).
183. See Krieger, supra note 115; Andrew M. Perlman, Remedying Law’s Partiality
Through Social Science, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 404 (Jon Hanson ed., 2012).
184. In fact, cognitive illusions may be more difficult to address than visual illusions.
KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 216–17.
185. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.

